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Decision-making competence reflects individual differences in the susceptibility to
committing decision-making errors, measured using tasks common from behavioral
decision research (e.g., framing effects, under/overconfidence, following decision rules).
Prior research demonstrates that those with higher decision-making competence report
lower incidence of health-risking and antisocial behaviors, but there has been less focus
on intermediate processes that may impact real-world decisions, and, in particular, those
implicated by normative models. Here we test the associations between measures of
youth decision-making competence (Y-DMC) and one such process, the degree to
which individuals make choices consistent with maximizing expected value (EV). Using
a task involving hypothetical gambles, we find that greater EV sensitivity is associated
with greater Y-DMC. Higher Y-DMC scores are associated with (a) choosing risky
options when EV favors those options and (b) avoiding risky options when EV favors
a certain option. This relationship is stronger for gambles that involved potential losses.
The results suggest that Y-DMC captures decision processes consistent with standard
normative evaluations of risky decisions.
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Introduction
Behavioral decision research illuminates how individuals’ actual decisions systematically deviate,
on average, from how they should behave according to normative theories (Hastie and Dawes,
2010). However, considerable heterogeneity across individuals is apparent for even the most
robust eﬀects, such as susceptibility to framing eﬀects, sunk costs, and under/overconﬁdence (e.g.,
Klayman et al., 1999; Stanovich, 1999; Levin et al., 2002). Researchers have begun to consider the
degree to which stable individual diﬀerences in susceptibility to these biases exist, and if these
diﬀerences predict psychosocial outcomes. An emerging literature on decision-making competence
suggests not only that a latent variable representing this over-arching cognitive competence exists,
but also that it demonstrates predictive validity across a range of problematic real-world behaviors,
including health-risking sexual behavior, delinquency, and self-reported decision outcomes (Parker
and Fischhoﬀ, 2005; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).
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Although these results shed light on the association between
decision-making competence and risk behavior, it remains
unclear how decision-making competence relates to component
evaluation processes that may lead to making a risky choice.
According to psychological risk-return models, risk behavior is
based on both perceptions of uncertainty (i.e., risk perceptions)
and expected beneﬁts, of the choice options (i.e., evaluation of
expected beneﬁts; Weber and Johnson, 2008). Given that the
latter also theoretically corresponds with decision making based
on a normative standard, we predict that choosing options that
have a more favorable expected value (EV), when considering
risky choices, will be associated with higher decision-making
competence. In a large sample of 18–19 year old community
residents, we repurpose a once-considered, but later abandoned,
decision-making task to examine the degree to which decision-
making competence is associated with EV sensitivity for risky
decisions involving either potential gains or losses. If this
hypothesis is supported, it would reinforce DMC’s conceptual
foundation of capturing deviations from normative decision
making.
Shifting From Path Independence to Risky
Choice and EV Sensitivity
Parker and Fischhoﬀ’s (2005) original study found positive
correlations across several well-documented decision-making
tasks (resisting framing eﬀects, resisting sunk costs, appropriate
conﬁdence in knowledge, consistent risk perceptions, applying
decision rules, and recognizing social norms), suggesting an
underlying latent construct labeled “Youth Decision-Making
Competence” (Y-DMC), as well as correlations between Y-DMC
and a comprehensive set of behavioral covariates and outcomes,
including executive cognitive functioning. However, Parker
and Fischhoﬀ (2005) also included another measure, path
independence, which was not consistently associated with neither
the other Y-DMC indices, nor the behavioral covariates and
outcomes. Subsequent similar null ﬁndings eventually led to the
removal of this measure from subsequent assessments (Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007).
For the path independence task, respondents’ choices between
certain outcomes and risky gambles (e.g., winning $50 for
sure versus a 50% chance to win $100, or $0) were judged
for their consistency with the rational-choice axiom of path
independence1, but no other normative criteria. Because the path
independence task presents respondents with choices between
simple gambles and certain gains or losses of varying that diﬀered
in the relative EV between choice options, measures of EV
sensitivity and risky choice (i.e., preference) can be derived.
EV Sensitivity for Potential Gains and Losses
Research has suggested relevant group-level diﬀerences in the
ability to make EV-sensitive decisions. For example, using
an expanded version of the “Cups” task, a repeated-measures
decision-making task involving EV-sensitive risky decisions for
potential gains and losses, patients with focal lesions to the
1Path independence speciﬁes that choices should be based on outcomes and their
likelihood, rather than the sequences of events leading to those outcomes.
ventromedial prefrontal cortex were especially EV-insensitive
(Weller et al., 2007). Research also suggests considerable
developmental diﬀerences in EV-sensitivity, in which young
children make less EV-sensitive choices than older children,
whereas older adults demonstrate lower EV sensitivity compared
to younger adults (e.g., Schlottmann and Tring, 2005; Henninger
et al., 2010; Weller et al., 2011). Moreover, Weller and Fisher
(2012) found that maltreated children (10–11 years) were less
EV sensitive than a same-age community comparison group,
particularly to avoid certain losses (c.f., Weller et al., 2015b).
A broader literature suggests potential asymmetries may arise
when considering risky decisions involving achieving potential
gains versus avoiding potential losses. Prospect theory, for
instance, states that individuals tend to be more risk-averse for
gains and risk-seeking for losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Developmental studies have suggested that the ability to make
EV-sensitive judgments when losses are involved may develop
later than for potential gains (Schlottmann and Tring, 2005; Levin
et al., 2007; Weller et al., 2011). Moreover, neuropsychological
research suggests that losses produce greater autonomic arousal
and attention-orienting responses compared to equal gains
(Satterthwaite et al., 2007; Rubaltelli et al., 2012), greater frontal-
cortical activation (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002), and may
activate a more complex neural processing system (Kuhnen
and Knutson, 2005). Additionally, decisions involving losses
have been associated with longer decision response latencies
than ones involving potential gains (Xue et al., 2009). Taken
together, these results suggest that losses dominate attention (see
Yechiam and Hochman, 2013 for a review), and that making EV-
sensitive choices in the face of potential lossesmay require greater
deliberative processing capacities in order to disengage from the
immediate threat of the potential loss.
Associations between Y-DMC, EV Sensitivity,
and Risk Behavior
Based on this research, we propose that individual diﬀerences
in cognitive capabilities may be associated more strongly with
the more cognitive component of risk evaluation, EV sensitivity,
than overall risk perceptions, which are more likely to involve
aﬀective, gut-level reactions regarding the behavior (e.g., Weber
et al., 2002). Because Y-DMC is conceptualized as reﬂecting a
more reasoned, deliberative approach to decisions, we expect
that higher Y-DMC will be associated with greater EV sensitivity,
but not necessarily overall risk taking. Supporting this assertion,
Weller et al. (2015a) found that decision-making competence
was associated more strongly with self-reported perceptions of
expected beneﬁts than with perceptions of risk across several
risk domains. However, in that study, expected beneﬁts were
assessed through subjective assessments rather than through
behavioral assessment of EV sensitivity. Further, choosing
in accordance with EV has been associated with indices of
intelligence and executive cognitive function in a manner similar
to decision-making competence, suggesting similar underlying
processes (e.g., Henninger et al., 2010; Donati et al., 2014; Webb
et al., 2014). Finally, because of the asymmetries in processing
gains and losses described above, we predict that the correlation
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between EV-sensitivity and Y-DMC will be stronger for potential
losses, relative to potential gains.
Methods
Participants
These data were collected through the Center for Education and
Drug Abuse Research (CEDAR) as part of a larger longitudinal
study. Participants were recruited at 9–13 years of age and were
assessed approximately every 2–3 years. The current data are
from the age 18–20 assessment (Wave 4). Further description of
the CEDAR design can be found in Tarter and Vanyukov (2001).
Five hundred twenty-ﬁve CEDAR respondents completed all
Y-DMC component measures2. Respondents were mostly male
(65.1%), on average 18.9 years old (SD = 0.5), 76.5% had a high
school diploma/GED, and 73.7% self-identiﬁed as Caucasian3.
Procedure and Measures
At the age 18–19 CEDAR assessment, participants completed the
Y-DMC measure, including the repurposed path independence
task.
Youth Decision-Making Competence
Youth decision-making competence consists of six tasks, selected
to cover skills central to normative decision-making theories
(Parker and Fischhoﬀ, 2005). Resistance to Framing measures
whether choices are aﬀected by formally irrelevant variations in
how options are described (e.g., condom eﬀectiveness described
in terms of success or failure rates) and includes ﬁve pairs of
items (two pairs include risky choices). Performance equals the
number of consistent choice pairs. Resistance to Sunk Cost uses
two single-choice problems to assess the willingness to abandon
an irrecoverable prior investment (i.e., sunk cost), considering
only future consequences. Performance equals the number of
such choices. Consistency in Risk Perception assesses the extent
to which sets of risk judgments are internally consistent (e.g., the
judged chance of dying from any cause “in the next year” should
be no larger than the same risk judged “between now and when
you turn 30”). Performance is the number of internally consistent
item sets (out of 5). Applying Decision Rules assesses the accurate
application of speciﬁc decision rules to seven hypothetical choices
among products characterized on multiple attributes within a
table format. Performance equals the number of correctly applied
decision rules. Under/overconﬁdence uses a 42-item true/false
knowledge questionnaire, in which each answer is accompanied
by a probabilistic conﬁdence judgment (50% = just guessing;
100% = absolutely sure). Scores equal the absolute value of the
diﬀerence between participant’s mean conﬁdence judgment and
the percent of correct true/false responses. Recognizing Social
Norms reﬂects a calibration between a respondent’s estimation
of the degree to which an undesirable behavior is normative
(e.g., “out of 100 people your age, how many would say it is
sometimes ‘OK’ to steal under certain circumstances”) and the
2Eight respondents had incomplete data and were dropped from this analysis.
3Education information was missing for one respondent.
actual percent of respondents who endorsed that “it is sometimes
‘OK’ to engage in each behavior.” Scores represent each person’s
within-subject correlation between judged norms and observed
norms. Finally, a composite Y-DMC score is calculated by the
mean of standardized component scores.
Risky-Choice Task
Participants were asked to make hypothetical choices (i.e., no real
payoﬀs) for 18 simple gambles between a certain option and a
risky option (e.g., win $50 for sure, 50% win $100, otherwise win
$0; see Supplementary Material). For each, an indiﬀerence option
(“doesn’t matter to me”) was also provided. Choices varied in
whether they involved either gains or losses, outcome magnitude
(potentially ranging from zero to $100), and the EV of gamble
relative to the certain option. Within gain and loss domains, some
decisions involved choices in which the certain option is greater
than the EV of the gamble (i.e., risk disadvantageous), for some
the EVs were equated (i.e., equal EV), and for some the gamble
had greater EV (i.e., risk advantageous). There were nine trials
for each domain, with three trials for each EV category. The range
of relative EV between choice options were equated, in terms of
absolute magnitude, for gains and losses.
Expected value sensitivity is the sum of choices in which
the participant selected the more favorable EV option for
risk-advantageous and risk-disadvantageous trials. Respondent
choices are scored a 1 if the chosen option has the more favorable
EV and zero otherwise. We also create summary variables for the
number of risky choices made on risk-advantageous, equal EV,
and risk-disadvantageous trials, for gains and losses, respectively.
A risky choice is coded +1 if the respondent chose the risky
option, 0 if the respondent chose “doesn’t matter to me,” and
−1 if the respondent chose the certain option4. Each measure
represents a sum of risk-taking for three decisions, and ranges
between −3 and +3. Thus, positive scores represent an overall
preference for risky options, whereas negative scores represent a
preference for certainty.
Results
Descriptive statistics for Y-DMC are supplied in Supplementary
Material.
Expected-Value Sensitivity
The upper portion of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for
the EV-sensitivity indices. Overall, respondents chose the more
favorable EV option 56.3% of the time.We found that individuals
displayed greater EV sensitivity for the gain domain than the loss
domain, t(522) = 5.35, p< 0.001, d = 0.235.
4We also explored the potential of scoring responses 1 only if they chose the gamble
and 0 otherwise (essentially lumping indiﬀerence responses with certain-option
responses). Results using this coding were qualitatively similar to those presented
below.
5Following guidance from Dunlop et al. (1996) for calculating eﬀect sizes for
correlated designs, we used the independent-samples t-test value rather than the
paired-samples t-test value because the latter is believed to overestimate eﬀect size
estimates.
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TABLE 1 | Expected value (EV) Sensitivity and its correlation with youth
decision-making competence (Y-DMC).
EV sensitivity
Summary Gain domain Loss domain Overall
Descriptive statistics
Potential range 0–6 0–6 0–12
Mean (SD) 3.55 (1.29) 3.21 (1.60) 6.76 (2.50)
Correlation with Y-DMC measure
Resistance to Framing 0.03 0.13a∗∗ 0.10∗
Resistance to Sunk Cost −0.06 0.06a 0.01
Consistency in Risk Perception 0.05 0.11a∗∗ 0.10∗
Applying Decision Rules 0.16∗∗∗ 0.29a∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
|Under/overconfidence| 0.10∗ 0.18a∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
Recognizing Social Norms 0.19∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
Y-DMC Composite 0.15∗∗∗ 0.31a∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; +p < 0.10. aRepresents a significant
difference between gain and loss trials, at p < 0.05, one-tailed, following Steiger’s
(1980) procedure.
The lower portion of Table 1 shows the associations
between EV Sensitivity and the Y-DMC tasks and composite
score. Consistent with our predictions, we found that Y-DMC
scores were associated with EV Sensitivity. Although we ﬁnd
a positive association between Y-DMC composite scores and
overall EV Sensitivity, the eﬀect size for the association
between the Y-DMC composite and EV Sensitivity for the
loss domain is double in magnitude compared to that
observed for the gain domain. Next, we followed Steiger’s
(1980) z-score procedure to test for diﬀerences between
dependent correlations. The correlation between composite
Y-DMC scores and EV Sensitivity was signiﬁcantly greater for
the loss domain than the gain domain. This pattern is robust
across the component measures, except for Recognizing Social
Norms, in which the correlations were nearly identical across
domains. Resistance to Sunk Costs was not associated with
EV Sensitivity in either domain, but the change from a non-
signiﬁcant negative to a non-signiﬁcant positive correlation was
signiﬁcant.
Risky Choice
The upper portion of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for
the six risky-choice composites. Respondents were more risk-
seeking (i.e., positive scores) when risk was advantageous and
risk-averse when risk was disadvantageous. Collapsing across
the diﬀerent EV levels, individuals were generally risk averse
for the gain domain (M = −2.58, SD = 4.62) and risk seeking
in the loss domain (M = 2.43, SD = 4.69). Furthermore,
irrespective of domain, respondents were risk-seeking for risk-
advantageous trials (M = 1.61, SD = 2.91), were indiﬀerent for
equal-EV trials (M = −0.10, SD = 2.56), and avoided risks for
risk-disadvantageous trials (M = −1.66, SD = 2.80). Overall,
respondents were relatively risk neutral (summing across all
measures in Table 1;M = −0.15, SD = 6.60).
The lower portion of Table 2 presents correlations between
risky choice and Y-DMC. For three scales (Resistance to Framing,
Resistance to Sunk Cost, and Consistency in Risk Perception), we
observed no systematic pattern of correlations with risk-taking.
However, Applying Decision Rules, Under/overconﬁdence, and
the Y-DMC composite correlate with greater risk-taking,
primarily in the loss domain. However, inspection of the
correlations suggest that this correlation is likely due to those
demonstrating greater Y-DMC being more likely to take the
gamble for risk-advantageous trials than those with lower Y-DMC
scores. Thus, this resulted in a null relationship between Y-DMC
and overall risk-taking (i.e., total number of risky choices;
r = 0.01, ns.).
Discussion
Y-DMC was designed to capture deviations from normative
decision making, so demonstrating concurrent validity with
TABLE 2 | Risk choice and its correlation with Y-DMC.
Gain domain Loss domain
Y-DMC Measure Risk
Advantageous
Equal
Expected Value
Risk
Disadvantageous
Risk
Advantageous
Equal
Expected Value
Risk
Disadvantageous
Descriptive statistics
Potential range −3–3 −3–3 −3–3 −3–3 −3–3 −3–3
Mean (SD) 0.08 (2.15) −1.04 (1.71) −1.62 (1.62) 1.53 (1.67) 0.94 (1.85) −0.04 (2.09)
Correlation with Y-DMC measure
Resistance to Framing 0.01 0.04 −0.02 0.10a∗ 0.07 −0.04
Resistance to Sunk Cost −0.04 0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.05 −0.09∗
Consistency in Risk Perception −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 0.04 0.04 −0.04
Applying Decision Rules 0.03 −0.08+ −0.11∗ 0.16a∗∗∗ 0.02a −0.13∗∗
|Under/overconfidence| 0.02 0.00 −0.11∗ 0.13a∗∗ 0.04 −0.11∗∗
Recognizing Social Norms 0.08+ 0.02 −0.05 0.16a∗∗∗ 0.12a∗∗ 0.01
Y-DMC Composite 0.03 0.00 −0.11∗ 0.19a∗∗∗ 0.08 −0.13∗∗
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; +p < 0.10. aRepresents a significant difference between gain and loss trials, at p < 0.05, one-tailed, following Steiger’s (1980)
procedure.
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another normative decision-making tendency, EV sensitivity,
not only widens its “nomological network” of related constructs
(Cronbach and Meehl, 1955), but also reinforces the conceptual
foundation of the decision-making competence construct. Those
displaying greater Y-DMC scores demonstrate greater EV
sensitivity, choosing gambles in risk-advantageous situations and
avoiding them when risk is disadvantageous. In contrast, Y-DMC
scores are not associated with overall risk-taking or on equal EV
trials. For equal EV trials in particular, a decision maker should
be indiﬀerent between the risky and certain options, and there is
no normative solution. With respect to psychological risk-return
models (see Weber and Johnson, 2008), these results suggest
that decision-making competence may impact risk behaviors via
diﬀerences in the evaluation of EV, rather than one’s perceptions
of risk (Weller et al., 2015a).
Also, consistent with our expectations, Y-DMC scores, and
especially the Applying Decision Rules, Under/overconﬁdence,
and Recognizing Social Norms subscales, are more strongly
associated to EV sensitivity when considering potential losses.
These ﬁndings support prior research revealing processing
diﬀerences for potential gains and losses. Potential losses are
believed to direct attention and evoke stronger autonomic
arousal (Yechiam and Hochman, 2013). In order to make more
EV-sensitive choices for losses, greater deliberative processing
resources may be needed to disengage from the emotional
impact of realizing a certain loss. Considering research that
demonstrates associations between cognitive executive function
and both DMC and advantageous decision making (e.g., Parker
and Fischhoﬀ, 2005; Del Missier et al., 2012; Webb et al.,
2014), we propose that these broader cognitive processes may
support normative decision making. As seen elsewhere, however,
more deliberative processing does not always lead to more
normative or advantageous behavior (e.g., Reyna, 2004), so
future research should explore the dynamics among these
constructs.
Although promising, the current results should be interpreted
in light of several limitations. First, because of the correlational
nature of this study, the data cannot speak strongly to
the psychological mechanisms that may support normative
decision making. Second, these are also secondary data analyses,
and therefore limited to existing measures. For example,
the path independence task includes a limited set of risky
choices, which restricts the range of possible EV sensitivity
and risk preferences. Additionally, certain Y-DMC subscales
have psychometric limitations. For instance, both the Y-DMC
Resistance to Framing and Resistance to Sunk Cost indices
demonstrate relatively lower internal consistency compared to
other measures, potentially attenuating observed correlations
(Parker and Fischhoﬀ, 2005). Both of these limitations have
been recognized and addressed in later measures (Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007; Weller et al., 2014). However, given the
secondary nature of these data, those improved versions were
not available. Additionally, other scales that have been associated
with tasks related to DMC, such as numeracy (Weller et al.,
2015c), were also not available. Future research using a reﬁned
set of measures could further establish the validity of the DMC
construct.
Finally, although we conceptualize DMC as a stable construct,
it does not imply that normative decision skills cannot be learned
or improved. Recent work has demonstrated such malleability.
In a direct approach, Jacobson et al. (2012) demonstrated
experimentally how decision education can improve decision-
making competence. More indirectly, interventions that develop
skills that may underlie and support advantageous decision
making, such as emotional regulation and goal setting, have
shown promise. For example, Weller et al. (2015b) found that
adolescent girls in foster care who received such an intervention
at approximately 11 years old demonstrated better EV sensitivity
approximately 5 years later, whereas girls who received only
traditional foster care services over this period were relatively
EV-insensitive for both risks involving potential gains and
losses.
In closing, the results reinforce our conceptualization
and the construct validity of decision-making competence,
demonstrating concurrent validity with another metric of
normative responding (EV sensitivity). By doing so, these results
contribute to a growing literature that aims to identify individual
diﬀerences in decision making and link these to important
psychosocial outcomes.
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